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FOR RELEASE FRIDAY A.M., 1'1arch 16, 1973 
CHINA AND THE UNITED STATES 
THE NEW CONGRESS AND THE NEW CHINA: AN AGENDA FOR ACTION 
Remarks of Senator Mike Mansfield (D., Montana) 
before the 
Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Study 
Washington, D. c. 
Thursday, March 15, 1973 
8:15 P. M. 
With Peking as the epi-center, the pattern of inter-
national relationships in Asia has undergone a series of earth-
quakes. The repercussions have been deep and pervading. When 
a new structure of stability emerges in the Western Pacific, 
it will manifest far-reaching changes. The main factors of 
change are already evident and I who uld like to list them at 
the outset. 
(1) The tragic u. S. involvement in the war in 
Indochina is, hopefully, at its tortured, dragged-out end . 
U. s. military power is moving off the Asian mainland. 
(2) ~fuether the character of the People's Republic 
has changed or our perceptions of China have improved is moot; 
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the United States has elected, at last, to close out the un -
declared war 3 the cold war, the proxy war, the peripheral war 
with the Chinese People's Republic . In turn, we have fo und 
the Chinese leadership in Peking most accommodating . 
(3) In a period of spreading peace, Japan possesses 
the most dynamic economy in Asia. The Japanese have skirted 
the Taiwan quicksands and have come, instead, to terms with 
the new China . They are now embarked on a multi-directional 
diplomacy built on the base of a vast foreign trade. Japan 
moves still, with intense awareness of the United States, but 
no longer in the shadow 0f U. S . policy. 
(4) To whatever depth the wedge has been driven 
between the Soviet Union and China, no signs point to imminent 
extraction; in the circumstances, Soviet policies which appear 
to be in a state of abeyance in Asia, remain uncertain and 
enigmatic . 
An ancient Chinese proverb says that "a journey of 
1, 000 miles begins with a single step. 11 Actually it says a 
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"journey n.f 333 1/3 miles." But with an ancient American 
tendency to overstate anything involving China, we have even 
managed to inflate its proverbs. In any event, the first step 
and several more have already been taken in Sino-U. S. recon-
ciliation. China and the United States are now moving rapidly 
towards the normal relationships of peace. This change has been 
produced by the combined talents of the nation's political com-
munity, as typified by the President, and of the Academic com-
munity, as represented by Dr. Kissinger. Democrats can hardly 
ride the President's coattails on the China question, nor, for 
that matter, can other Republicans. Whether Johns Hopkins can 
claim a share of cridit for Harvard's contribution, I leave to 
your judgment. 
It will help to understand how .far we have come in 
Sino-U. s. relations if we look for a moment at the old China 
policy which was washed away in the Chou-Nixon toasts in Peking 
last winter. That pnlicy was nne of boycott and ostracism and 
it can be said to have begun with the inauguration of the 
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People's Republic of China in Peking in 1949. At that time, 
we saw not the birth of new hope in China, but rather the dashing 
of our hopes for a durable peace after World War II. The new 
government was viewed as not Chinese at all, but rather as an 
alien outpost of a worldwide Communist conspiracy led by the 
Soviet Union. We told ourselves that it was bound to be short-
lived, soon to be overthrown by the righteous wrath of the 
Chinese people. 
This interpretation may seem somewhat incredible toda:r. 
However, I can assure those of you who are too young to remember 
that it was the prevailing interpretation a quarter of a century 
ago. It was an interpretation spawned largely by the anxieties, 
fears and angers generated in the cataclysmic upheaval of the 
Chinese revolution. 
In view of the distorted depiction of the new China 
in 1949 and the sense of betrayal to which it gave rise in this 
country, it is not surprising that American public life came to 
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be dominated by a nationwide witch-hunt. Everywhere t he 
search went out for the culprits 11 who had lost China. 11 Educa-
tors, politicians, journalists, ministers, bureaucrats, business-
men or whatever--none was exempt from the field-day of the 
ideological carpet-baggers. In the atmosphere of those times, 
rational discussion soon gave way to a massive bi-partisan 
denunciation of the new China. Indeed, Democrats vied with 
Republicans in expressing a hostile aversion to what had 
emerged in Peking. 
The American mood in 1949 was one of fear, frustration 
and fury. Spearheaded by these emotions, it is little wonder 
t hat we moved, almost eagerly, into the devastating peripheral 
war with China in Korea. Simultaneously, our diplomacy plunged 
us into the middle of the Taiwan problem and opened the door to 
eventual direct military involvement in Indochina and Southeast 
Asia. Everywhere in Asia, 11 containment of China 11 was enshrined 
as a cardinal ob jective of our policies. 
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After the Korean truce and the Geneva Accords of 1954 
the wings of a Sino-U. s. reconciliation beat feebly from time 
to time but never with sufficient strength to dispell a smolder-
ing mutual resentment . For many years, Department of State 
representatives maintained intermittent contact with Chinese 
diplomats in Europe . At no time, however, did these meetings 
confront the major issues . While European and other nations 
were coming to terms with the People ' s Republic, the United 
States under successive PresidentsJ reaffirmed time and again 
that Taiwan was China. Insofar as this nation was concerned, 
Peking was then and forever consigned to international limbo . 
The Executive Branch engineered and Congress financed 
a ring of military compacts around China 's borders . Links in 
the chain were formed by SEATO and Mutual Defense treaties with 
the Republic of China on Taiwan, Japan and the Republic of Korea . 
With these treaties came a strengthening of the U. s . military 
base structure throughout Asia and the quasi-permanent 
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dep l oyment of ten s of thousands of u. S. t r oops tn man the 
bases. Tens of billions of dollars poured forth for our 
forces in the Far East and for massive aid and thousands of 
advisors to allies, new and old . 
A stringent boycott was clamped on all trade with 
the Chinese mainland . Cultural and nther contacts were shut 
off . It became illegal to purchase even a pair of chopsticks 
in Hong Kong if they were fashioned in China, or to sell the 
Chinese a pair of shoe-laces, even by way of a u. S .-owned 
factory in Canada . As for our understanding of the new China, 
what we learned, we learned second - hand and more often than not 
through the distorting prisms of Taiwan and Hong Kong . An 
American newsman who had the temerity to journey to China in 
the face of an Executive Branch prohibition on all such travel 
was compelle~ subsequently, to go to court to obtain a pass-
port to ply his trade abroad . 
It was almost as though we were determined to blot 
out of our ken the very existence of the Chinese mainland and 
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what was transpiring thereon. Even when serious difficulties 
emerged in Soviet-Chinese relations, we were at first incred-
ulous and suspected a joint plot aimed at the "Free World." 
It was only much later that we were prepared to acknowledge the 
reality and abandon the concept of a worldwide Communist mono-
lith based on Moscow. 
In doing so, however, we did not change our view of 
the government in Peking. We still saw the People 1 s Republic 
as a reckless, belligerent and powerful Chinese dragon with its 
corralling as the end purpose of our Asian policies and programs, 
All the while, it is now apparent, the Chinese people were seeing 
themselves as a beleaguered, undeveloped country, beset on all 
sides by enemies who had been marshalled by the Un ited States 
to undo the achievements of the Chinese revolution.; 
It is now known that during these years of ostracism, 
the Chinese stress was not on aggression beyond their borders, 
but on military defense of their own territory. It is now 
known, too, that the maximum emphasis of these years was given 
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to production for peaceful purposes. The Chinese were pre-
occupied with feeding~ clothing and sheltering three-quarters 
of a billion people and with developing a social and economic 
structure which would give durability to the ideology of 
Mao Tse-tung. In retrospect~ it is clear that we expended 
billions in Asia to deter what we believed was an aggressive 
China at precisely the time when Chinese energies were being 
redirected away from militant revolution into militant social 
reconstruction. 
The gash in our understanding was largely self-
inflicted. To a large extent~ as I have indicated, we cut our-
selves off from what was happening inside China. The cost of 
this exercise in ostrichism is incalculable. It had much to 
do with leading more than two and a half million Americans into 
the military quagmires of the Asian mainland. Thirty-three 
thousand Americans never returned from the hills and valleys of 
Korea where many died in unnecessary conflict with vast Chinese 
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armies north of the 38th parallel. Another 46,000 Americans 
gave their lives in the paddies and jungles of Indochina. 
The $150 billion, plus, cost of the Vietnamese war pales in 
comparison with the tragedy of devastated lives, of a shattered 
national unity and of the decline in the general sense of well-
being of the nation . 
Nevertheless, the dollar price of this misbegotten 
policy is not to be ignored. The price is now stated as upwards 
of $150 billion for Indochina alone but the full costs of that 
tragic adventure will be borne by the American people well into 
the next century, with the present price-tag not doubling but 
tripling. The wastage stalks both our national and inter-
national footsteps. It casts reflections in the ever-rising 
prices at home and in the declining value of the dollar abroad. 
It has left us ill-prepared for the emerging challenges of a 
period of peace. 
To be sure, the damage of two decades is done and 
cannot be undone . I have sketched this past of China policy, 
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not in recrimination; few of us who lived t hrough the period 
are completely free of responsibility for the distortions. I 
have sketched it in some detail because an awareness of the 
soil in which the old policy was planted is necessary to the 
cultivation of a fruitful new policy with regard to China and, 
indeed, all of Asia . 
As I have already noted, President Nixon ' s visit to 
China last year marked a turning point . The visit, properly, 
brought him public gratitude and acclaim . His greatest foreign -
policy initiative has made possible the narrowing of t he vast 
chasm in Sino- American relations . The remaining gap is closing 
rapidly, more rapidly than anticipated in the most sanguine of 
expectations a year ago . 
I n retrospect, it is clear t hat t he warm reaction at 
home to the President ' s initiative indicated that t h e nation 
had long-since been ready for a new look at the situation . What 
the President supplied was the missing ingredient--the political 
courage to acknowledge that we had been on the wrong track . 
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From the outset, Congress has supported the 
President's initiative, The visits of the joint Senate 
leadership and of the House leaders to China shortly after 
the President's return underscored the cohesiveness of the 
Executive and Legislative Branches on this issue. I should 
note in passing that long before Dr. Kissinger's visit, 
there had been exchanges between the White House and t he 
Senate leadership with regard to the desirability of re-
establishing communications with Peking, In fact, the 
j oint effort to open the door began with the first private 
meeting between the President and the Senate Democratic 
Leader at the outset of his first Administration, in fact , 
in the first month. 
Mike Mansfield Papers, Series 21, Box 48, Folder 68, Mansfield Libary, University of Montana
-13-
The Pres i dent, howe ver, ha d t~ be a nd ha s been the key 
f i gure i n th i s development. He had t~ put before the ent i re 
na t ion a revised est i mate of the new Chi na. He had to shi ft 
r i tual jzed a tt j tudes by 180) a nd he d i d so, i n my judgment, 
wi th consummate s ki ll. 
Where, then, d ~es C~ngress fit i nto the s ituat i~n ° 
It can scarcely be s a id that whjle the Ececut i ve Branch was 
pursui ng the policy of ostrac i sm, 'a hundred fl owers bloomed 
i n the Senate on the Chin~ issue. For the most part , Congress 
wa s c ontent t o r 1de the policy. Here and there, howe ver , 
i nd i vidual Members and the Foreign Relations and other Comm i ttees 
d i d ma ke c ~ntribut i~ns t o recasting publ i c understand i ng a nd 
att i tudes. In March 1368, five yea rs ago i n a lecture at the 
Un i vers i ty of Monta na, I expressed the vi ew that 
··the ba s i c adjustment whi ch i s needed In 
pol i c i es re spect i ng Ch i na i_ s t o ma ke crystal clea r 
tha t this government doe s not ant i c j pa te, much l e s s 
does i t see k, the overthr~w of the government on the 
Chi nese mainla nd. In add i tion, there i s a need to 
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end the discriminati~n wh j ch consigns to China an 
inferior status as among the Communist countries 
in this nation's policies respecting travel and 
trade. Finally, it ought t~ be made unequ i v~ca l 
that we are prepared at all times to meet wi th 
Chinese representatives--f~rmally ~r j_ nf~rmally-­
in ~rder t~ consider differences between China 
and the United States ~ver Viet Nam ~r any other 
quest i~n ~f c ~mm~n c~ncern. 
The transiti~n in policy dur i ng the last year or 
s~ has fo ll~wed this pattern closely and the trans i t i~n has 
had support fr om the Senate, alm~st t~ a man. In due c~urse, 
I am conf i dent Members of both parties and both H~uses will 
j oin the expanding ranks of travellers t o China. In so doing, 
they will familiarize themselves first-hand with the s itua-
tion and, hence, sharpen the i r understanding ~f unf~ld-
i ng deve lo pments. The glowing reports of heretof~re skeptical 
newspaper columnists who have recently visited China indicate 
that such visits can serve more effective l y as eye-openers 
than what is usually served for that purpose at the bar of the 
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National Press Club. China i s, i ndeed, heady stuff and it js 
most desirable that, as we pr~ceed with the rappr~chement, we 
open our minds with understanding and prudence. 
It seems to me that the t i me is appr~aching for 
Congress,to supplement a general support of the President's 
initiatives on China with substantive legislative action. The 
93rd Congress i s just getting underway, and j t can make a most 
useful c~ntribution by wiping the statutory slate clean ~f the 
anti-Chinese legislation of the past two decades. 
The F~rmosa Resolut i on, f or example, remains on the 
books. It is a post-dated check which, for all pract i cal 
purposes, gives a Congressional endorsement to the unfettered 
use of the U.S. Armed Forces to assist the Chinese National 
forces on Taiwan. Under the terms of the ResolutionJ the 
questi~n ~f how and when t~ use these f~rces i s left to the 
sole discreti~n of the Executive Branch. Whatever its ~riginal 
validity and, in retrospect, it was a dubi~us one at best, the 
Fo rm~sa Resolution is out ~f keeping with the policy which the 
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President i s n0w rursu i ng j n regard t ~ the Pe 0 pl e's Republ i c 
o f China. Even if that were n0t the case, I must express 
grave reservations wt th regard t o all blank-chec ks drawn on 
the ''war-and-peace ' powers of the Congress. The Fo rmosa 
Res 0lut ion i s remi niscent, f a r example , 0 f the Tonk i n Gulf 
Res a lut i 0n which 'greased ' the way fa r the Executive Branch 
t o sl i de int 0 the military involvement i n Viet Nam. If we have 
lea rned anyth i n g fr 0m that exper i ence, i t ought t o be tha t the 
i n i t ia t ion o f the massive use of farce by t he Un i ted St a tes a t 
the s a le discret ion o f one branch o f government i s a per i l ous 
Const i tut ional pract ice. 
The F 0rmo sa Res o lut ion was o r iginally des igned f a r 
a n emergency, a l most a s a persona l accommoda t ion t o Pres ~ dent 
Ei senhower ; i t has remained on the sta tute books t 0 susta i n 
what i s n ow a d i scarded po l i cy a n Ch i n a . In 1 ~71 the Fore i gn 
Re l at ions C0mm i ttee vo ted to repeal the Resolut ion. Th i s act i0n 
wa s rejected i n the Senate at the time by a v o te o f 43-40. It i s 
t im~ again, i t seems t o me, t o put the matter befo re the Congress. 
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For many years, th i s nati ~n helped t o sustaln the 
ficti~n that Ta iwan sp~ke for the hundreds of millions in 
China. In support of that fiction, the United States funnelled 
five billion dollars in military and economic aid into an 
island whose population at the ~utset of thi s policy was less 
than ten mill ion. Th i s f t nanc i al stimulus produced spectacular 
economic results . It also served to pay f or an over-s iz ed, 
highly mechani~ ed Army and to keep alive the ho pe of the Nation-
al G~vernment that these forces would one day spearhead a 
return to the Chinese mainland . That hope has all but di s -
appeared i n Taiwan ; so, t oo , have the fears ~ f a military 
invasi ~n fr om the Mainland. 
Economic aid to Taiwan has now been d i sc ontinued . 
Spurred by great i nputs of cap i tal, i n part icular, fr~m the 
United States and Japan, the modernized econ~my .of Taiwan is 
actually in a p ~sition t o extend a i d to less-developed countries 
i n Asia, Africa, and elsewhere . St i ll flowing i nt o the i s land, 
however, is U. S . military aid in the f orm of hardware and 
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advice~· on how to use it. The United States maintains, on 
Taiwan, a military advisory group of 165 officers and men. In 
addition, more than 3,000 members of the armed forces are also.· 
.r. 
there in connection with activities related to Viet Nam. 
The deployment of this large force is obsolete in 
view of the Vietnamese truce and I am confident that the 
Congress will concur in a dec ision to wi thdraw it . The 
President and the Congress, moreover, can and should work 
together to bring about the termination of the military aid 
mission which remains as a vestige of our past involvement 
in the Chinese civil war. 
In addition, it should be noted that over $100 
million in military grant aid and credit sales for Taiwan 
were requested o f Congress for the current f i scal year. It 
is difficult to see the sense in continuing to give away tens 
of millions of U.S. dollars in this fashion. As long as we 
continue to provide military aid and adv i sors to Taiwan, we 
remain imbedded in what we have now recognized to be an internal 
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Chinese affajr, There i s every rea son t o a ssume tha t Ta i wan's 
a rmed f orces a re capable of de f end i ng themselves. Tn any event , 
t t i s hard t o bel i eve tha t a U.S. aid pr~gram any l onger 
const i tutes the marg i n f or surv i val. Ways must be found f or 
preservi ng the stab i l i ty of regions of the South China Seas 
other than f or thi s nat ion to c 1nt\nue t o arm a sma l l segment 
of Chi nese pe ople on the i sland of Taiwan aga i nst the rest. 
Although the wi nds of change are sweep i ng away 
past policies throughout As i a, st i ll i ntact i s the r i ng of 
peripheral ant i -Chi nese treaties. From the outset, it seems t o 
me, the tac i t assumpt ion of these treat i es i s tha t the United 
States i s an As i a power, wh i ch it i s not, wi th a prime responsi-
bil i ty f or i nfluenc i ng and controll i ng change on the Asian 
ma i nland. It i s an assumpt ion which fl owed effortlessly f r om 
the decisive role of the United Sta tes i n the defeat of Japan 
i n World War II. It is an assumpt ion whi ch is twenty-five 
years old and needs to be exami ned afresh. 
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The United States is, and will continue to be, a nation 
with vast interests and responsibilities in the Pacific, interests 
which extend to the western reaches of the ocean . These interests, 
however, do not compel us to continue to maintain, as we do, 
260,000 armed men on the mainland and off-shore islands of the 
Asian continent. In a time of spreading peace, forces of this 
magnitude appear unrelated to any valid interests of the United 
States. On the contrary, they seem more an expensive residue of 
the pred.ominant U.S. power which the Untted States asserted in 
that region at the end of World War II. 
We need to be aware that such residues do not come 
cheaply . They are paid for--the people of the nation pay for ·-· 
them--at a rate of many billions of dollars each year. Expend-
itures of this kjnd have something t o do with the rising cost of 
food at home and the astronomical dollar price of hotel accommod-
ationsJnTokyo or Hong Kong. I reiterate this theme because 
there is a tendency t o ignore the c os t factors which are involved 
i n anachronistic displays of our military power abroad and the 
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relationship 0f this cost to the debilitated state of the 
economy. The presence of the flag on the beaches of Asia may 
be as thrilling a sight as its appearance on the moon. In 
both cases, however, the thrill carries a very high price. 
There is n0 national interest which requires us to maintain 
every major U.S. power-core abroad simply because there may 
have once been a vital use for it. 
In my judgment, the time has long been here for a 
deliberate phase-out of all American installations and forces 
which remain on the Asian mainland. The 40,000 plus U.S. tr0ops 
in Korea are largely an irrelevant luxury, twenty years after the 
end of the Korean war. In the same category are the 45,000 
U.S. forces in Thailand. So, too, are many of the U.S. bases 
and installations in Japan. 
Treaties are not chiseled in stone; much less are 
executive agreements. The Defense treaty with the Republic of 
China on Taiwan obviously needs t0 be re-examined in the light 
of the President's initiative with regard to Peking. In a 
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similar vein, the SEATO Treaty has shown itself t o be, i n v i ew 
of the involvement in Indochina, not merely an inconsequential 
relic of the past, but a devastingly costly enterprise and a 
positive hazard to the interests of this nation. 
One of the justifications for the SEATO Treaty--
which, in . passing, I should note, I signed at the request of 
President Eisenhower in Manila nineteen years ago--one of the 
justificat i ons f or SEATO was the high hopes that i t would lead 
i n time t o collective security and regional cooperation in Asia. 
That hope never gpt off the ground, and, in my judgment, the 
tragic war i n Indochina has now delivered acoup-de-grace t o th i s 
empty pact, a view which appears t o be shared by v i rtually all 
of the other s i gnator i es. 
Both treaties should be re-examined as part of a 
through, in-depth rev i ew of our overall pos i t ion i n the West-
ern Pacific which der i~es from many treat i es, agreements , and 
pract i ces. It is t o be hoped that the Commission on the Organ-
i zation of the Government f or the Conduct of Foreign Policy and 
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the F~reign Relat i ~ns C~mmittee will pursue intensive studies 
of the status of these treaties and other commitments in Asia, 
and elsewhere, during the current Congress. 
Until the Taiwan situation is clarified, we shall 
probably find ourselves looking primarily to trade and other 
exchanges for the cement of relations with the new China. The 
liais~n offices--extraordinary edifices--which will open · soon 
ln~Washington:and/Peking will facilitate this process. Both 
countries are carrying out the pledge of the Shanghai c~mmuniq~e, 
re-emphasied in the February 22 communique, t~ broaden mutual 
understanding thr~ugh contacts and exchanges. Fr~m my own 
experience i n China last year, I am persuaded that this 
personal interaction can be ~f great significance. 
There is much to be learned from the culture of the 
old China. There is much, too, to be learned from the innov-
ations and practices of the new China. From accupuncture to 
tne recycling of human waste, health, pollution, across the 
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spectrum of the current concerns ~f Americans--there is much 
to be learned from the People's Republic. The Chinese will 
lear~ too, from us in science, in techn~logy and the arts. 
The cr~ss-fertilization of human experiences has 
been resumed between China and the United States. The 
educati~nal interchange has begun anew. This time the exchanges 
are on the basis of equality. Thi s time the exchanges can 
bring mutual and durable benefit t o both peo pl es. Last year, 
more than l,OJO Amer icans--d~ctors, profess ~rs , j ournal i sts, 
sc i entists , businessmen, and p~l i t ical leaders--vi sited China. 
Four groups of Ch i nese have n~w come t o see us and t o show us. 
I am c~nf ident that the tw~-way flow wi ll accelerate wi th 
t i me. 
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Exchanges cost a great deal of money. I am informed, 
for example, that a three-week tour of China by the Philadelphia 
Orchestra could cost about $350,000, even with the Chinese 
paying all in-country costs. The amounts are large even though 
they are insignificant when compared with the waste which still 
attaches to the pursuit of our foreign and military policies in 
and around the rim of Asia . 
It would be my expectation that funds for cultural 
exchange with China could be made available out of savings in 
these areas . Indeed, one of the contributions which can be made 
by Congress is to assert budgetary priorities that will bring 
about such a shift . Small investments in exchanges by both 
countries, can pay rich dividends in mutual understanding, 
friendly contact and cultural enrichment . 
A special responsibility devolves on the Congress in 
the field of trade with China . Good trading relations mean good 
foreign relations and especially at this time. The Chinese 
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have a record of scrupulously living up to agreements to which 
they put their signatures, whether sales contracts or political 
settlements . 
China's needs from abroad have been deliberately 
restrained . In the past decade or more, the Chinese have looked 
to their own resources for economic building blocks, concen-
trating on developing a largely self-contained productive 
capacity . Such foreign trade as there is remains governed by 
two basic principles: (1) equality and mutual benefit, and 
(2) exchange of what China has in surplus for what is lacking . 
As a general practice, a rough balance is maintained between 
imports and exports. Hence, China has no external debts of 
any consequence . 
As economic development accelerates, there may be 
changes in the Chinese approach to trade relations with the 
outside world . For the present, however, no sudden change is 
to be expected . Because the doors to America ' s warehouses have 
at last been unsealed does not mean that Chinese traders will 
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rush to enter and such bill boards as there are in China are 
not available for the advertising of foreign products. They 
are used, rather, to stress Chinese effort in production even 
as they urge restraint in Chinese consumption. 
China's foreign trade is small. In 1972 the total 
was estimated to be $5 billion, roughly balanced between imports 
and exports. That amounts to a trade turnover of less than 
one-half of one percent of our gross national product. 
u. s. trade with China has responded promptly to the 
removal of the embargo by President Nixon . At the Canton trade 
fair last fall, for example, there were 75 American businessmen, 
twice the number attending the spring fair. From $5 million 
in 1971, U. S.-China trade increased to $92 million last year; 
$60 million in exports to China, primarily of farm products, 
and $23 million in imports from China. Exports to China could 
reach $350 million this year, with the shipment of Boeing 707s 
and the sale of large amounts of cotton and other farm products. 
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Even the most optimistic observers~ however, do not believe 
China's exports to the United States will exceed $50 million 
this year. 
Part of the disparity derives from u. S. tariff dis-
crimination against Chinese imports. Until caught up in the 
frenzy of cold war, traditional trade policy was to give most-
favored-nation treatment to imports from all countries, re-
gardless of politics. But twenty-two years ago, the Chinese 
mainland, along with other Communist countries, was denied that 
treatment. 
The President has now negotiated a trade agreement 
with the Soviet Union providing for most-favored-nation treat-
ment . There is no reason whatsoever to do less, in my judg-
ment, with regard to Peking. It has been estimated that about 
50 percent of China's exports to the United States are affected 
by lack of most-favored-nation treatment. The present gross 
trade imbalance with China cannot continue indefinitely. 
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Either Chinese purchases here will drop or more will have to 
be bought from China or new multi-angular patterns of trade 
will have to be encouraged in the Western Pacific. 
It would be my hope that Congress will provide 
authority to negotiate a most-favored-nation arrangement with 
China along the lines of the recent agreement with the Soviet 
Union. Such an arrangement could be consummated, notwithstand-
ing the absence of formal diplomatic relations. I should note 
that with regard to the Soviet Union, the pending trade-agreement 
is now clouded by the Mills-Jackson amendment which relates to 
the emigration payments required of Soviet Jews seeking to go 
to Israel. That should not deter Congressional action on most-
favored-nation treatment for China. The two situations are not 
analogous and it would be most unfortunate to lose momentum 
which has been generated in the Sino-u. s. rapprochement over 
what is an unrelated issue in Europe. 
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In closing) I would reiterate that a China policy 
based on myth and self- deception has been a major factor in 
the atmosphere of crises in which we have lived since the end 
of World War II . Before the Nixon Administration neither the 
Executive Branch nor the Congress did very much to rectify our 
relationship with the new China . The President's initiative 
in going to Peking has brought usJ at lastJ to grips with this 
neglected situation. It remains for the Legislative Branch) now; 
to take action to remove the accumulated legal barnacles of the 
past . In so doing) Congress will join tangibly with the 
President in normalizing our relations with the Chinese People's 
Republic . 
In doing soJ moreover) Congress will contribute to 
the improvement of the prospects for peace in the Western 
Pacific and in the world . There is no doubt that what happens 
in and around China forms an enormous segment of those pros-
pects even though China eschews the label "Great Power . " 
Chinese society) today) is strong and unified perhaps as never 
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before in history. It has a dynamism based on a 11 one for all 
and all for one 11 concept. "Serve the people 11 is more than a 
slogan, it is a national way of life. To visit China is to feel, 
personally, the vitality of a vast, intelligent and highly 
competent people and the social enthusiasm which has been gener-
ated by their new society. The visible differences between China 
today and twenty years ago are stupendous. The invisible dif-
ferences may even be greater . All indications are that the 
next ten years are likely to add enormously to what has already 
been achieved. 
We are entered on a new era of relations with China. 
We cannot wipe the slate of the past clean and start afresh. 
Neither political nor personal relationships are so forg iving. 
Even now, we confront a residue of stumbling blocks from the 
past, many of which go back to the 19th century in the form of 
superior-inferior concepts of China. The job of removing these 
blocks insofar as they derive from official policy and law 
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rests with the President and the Congress. I n a deeper sense, 
the job is educational. As we proceed to do what must be donej 
however, the path will open to a new era of stability in the 
Western Pacific . It will be an er.a based, not on the military 
preeminence of any single nation but on the mutual efforts and 
forebearance of all t he concerned nations . There is every 
reason to expect that the new China will join with us and 
others in building that kind of a peace in the Pacific, a 
peace which can be derived through patience, perseverance and 
perspicacity . 
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